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Abstract
This paper investigated the impact of politi-
cal developments (civil liberties index and political 
rights index) on tax revenues index (ratio of total tax 
revenues in real GDP) in some selected countries of 
Middle East for the period of 1990-2010. Results of 
hypothesis testing with generalized method of mo-
ments (GMM) in selected countries of Middle East 
between 1990 and 2010 indicated that Political de-
velopment (civil liberties index and political rights 
index) had significant effect on the ratio of total tax 
revenue on real GDP. 
Keywords: civil liberties index, political rights 
index, tax revenues, GMM.
Introduction
In essence, “Political development” is defined 
as increase capacity and efficiency of a political re-
gime to do:
• Essential changes in the socio-economical 
structure of the society.
• Efforts in resolving individual and commu-
nal contradiction/ conflicts.
• Popular and democratic state framework.
• Democratic and basic social changes in the 
society. 
In other words, political development is a pre-
requisite for achieving progress; relieve poverty and 
colonialism, structural reforms and improving the 
social and industrial sectors. Finally, it is a move-
ment of previous unfavorable condition to better 
condition for all. Political development is in direct 
relation with political participation culture, agita-
tion and communication.
In this respect, various indexes are utilized to 
monitor political development; such as: “civil liber-
ties” and” political rights”.
Civil liberties is the right of the individual to 
personal freedom, acquire property, Right to wor-
ship or religious rights, and freedom of expression. 
This concept is protected by the law, against inter-
ferences from the governments or any other such 
third parties.
Political rights are monitored as per the three 
paradigms: electoral process, political pluralism 
and participation, and functioning of government. 
Civil liberties are monitored as per four paradigms: 
freedom of expression and belief, associational and 
organizational rights, rule of law, and personal au-
tonomy and individual rights. These aspects of po-
litical development are reported by the “Freedom 
House”.
Thus, the main purpose of this paper shall be 
analyze and measure the amount of impact, politi-
cal development has on the tax revenues (with em-
phasis on the political rights and civil liberties in-
dex) in selected Middle East countries1 between 
1990 and 2010. For the following hypothesis test, 
the dynamic panel and generalized method of mo-
ments (GMM) has been adopted.
1 Group of selected countries of the Middle East: Af-
ghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Egypt, Geor-
gia, Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, 
Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Yemen, United Arab Emirates 
and Oman.
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• The relationship between political develop-
ment (political development index and civil liberties 
Index) and Tax revenue is significant
Collected data in this paper are extracted from 
the statistics reported by The World Bank and Free-
dom House. Once, the theoretical basis and history 
of the report are discussed, the Model adopted is es-
timated by E-Views 6 and finally, Suggested politi-
cal policy will be introduced.
Literature review
Recent revolutionary movements in the Mid-
dle East, called “Arab Spring” have highlighted the 
importance of the political rights and civil liberties 
and the elimination of dictatorship. Most Middle 
Eastern countries are oil rich states owned oil in-
dustry and the tax revenue plays a minor part in the 
state’s overall income.
Therefore, taxation is for some, non-existent or 
poorly practiced. Furthermore, oil rich states, does 
not consider accountability a virtue of the modern 
governance and in most cases, is not dependent on 
public taxation. Due to undemocratic state of the 
rulers, public expenditure of the so called natural 
resources is not under the scrutiny of any govern-
ment or civil organizations and consequently prone 
to wide-spread corruption and injustice. 
On the other hand, the public who do not con-
tribute to the state funds “financial affairs” will not 
expect any accountability from the state, either. 
This mutated social structure, has contributed to the 
development of dictatorships in the Middle East.
Recently, modern democratic states are elect-
ed by the votes of the public voters, from among few 
candidates of different political parties. These candi-
dates, are dependent on the public votes, therefore 
they will have to present some sort of guarantees to 
the demands of their constituency. For that promise 
to materialize, they will need a sufficient amount of 
Tax revenues. Vice versa, the public will expect re-
sponsibility and accountability from their elected rep-
resentatives. This is in return for their vote and trust.
Some research findings show that substantial 
part of public spending depends on regime politics 
(democratic) model and interact with the distribu-
tion of income, the preferences of citizens and eco-
nomic conditions (Boix,2003). Also, there are a sig-
nificant relationship between the extension of voting 
rights and the size of government (Aidt et al, 2006). 
Also, most research has shown that there was a 
U-shaped relationship between democracy and the 
level of public spending (Every one of public expen-
diture measures includes government expenditures, 
education costs and social costs as a percentage of 
GDP) in democratic and non-democratic coun-
tries which respectively have the large and small states 
(Mulligan et al. 2004, Plümper and Martin,2003). They 
argue that for low levels of democracy public spending 
is high to meet the requests of rents by the elites, while 
for high levels of democracy public spending is high 
due to popular demand of public goods.
Musgrave (1969) in his classical predictions 
stated that compared to democracies countries, au-
tocratic states which directly control the economy 
and in particular the wage level, tax mechanism 
rather than relying on individual taxes sources of 
income relies on corporation tax. For describing 
this system, it is argued that the mature democracy 
is the result of greater reliance on income sources 
such as voluntary personal tax income.
Thus, the repressive governments cannot rely 
on this type of income sources, they were required 
to manufacturers and companies voluntarily coop-
erate in the tax on production or trade. 
In democratic countries, the priority is on vol-
untary payments and the governments are based on 
personal income tax. But the undemocratic coun-
tries and at low levels of democracy, suppression has 
reduced the willingness of citizens to pay tax on in-
dividual income, As a result, property and trade tax 
as the only source of income remains for undemo-
cratic governments.
Herb (2003) expresses that rentier states don’t 
need to their citizens tax and crucial link between 
citizens and their governments. Thus cannot be 
seen breaking a dimming the prospects for democ-
racy. He pays particular attention to the possibility 
that there are both positive and negative effects of 
rentierism on democracy by using a cross-regional 
dataset, between 1972 and 2000. He does not find 
consistent support for the notion that there is a net 
negative effect of rentierism on the prospects that a 
country will be democratic. He finds that democ-
racy scores in the surrounding region are strongly 
correlated with a country’s own democracy score.
Micheal L.Ross (2004), is expressed that taxa-
tion led to government representation in the past, 
Representative government first came about in ear-
ly modern Europe when monarchs were compelled 
to relinquish some of their authority to parliamen-
tary institutions, in exchange for the ability to raise 
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new taxes; similarly, the war for independence in 
the United States began as a rebellion against Brit-
ish taxes. Some scholars argue that a comparable pro-
cess is occurring and pressure to increase taxes forc-
es authoritarian regimes to acceptance of democracy. 
These claims have never been carefully tested. In 
Micheal L.Ross research, this claim has been test-
ed among 113 countries in the period 1971-1997 by 
pooled time-series cross-national data. The results 
show that a single standard deviation increase in the 
ratio of taxes to government spending Rise 0.48 de-
mocracy scale. While this is somewhat smaller than 
the effects of Oil and Islam, it is about one-third 
larger than the influence of Catholic.
Helene Ehrhart (2009) has reviewed the rela-
tionship between democracy and domestic taxes in 
developing countries by using a panel of 66 devel-
oping countries over the period 1990-2005.  The 
results show that Achieving to democracy matters 
is necessary in order to earn more domestic tax 
revenues which are much needed to finance pub-
lic goods. It is used especially at the level of ad-
ministrative constraints which is of importance to 
counter the government’s propensity to cave in for 
special interests and to be insufficiently welfare 
minded. Also, she finds that high levels of democ-
racy are specifically needed in natural resource 
rich countries to make natural resource rents con-
tribute to higher domestic tax revenues and no lon-
ger be an impediment to a sustained tax system.
Paola Profeta, Riccardo Puglisi and Simona 
Scabrosetti (2010) explore the relation between 
political variables and tax revenue, public spend-
ing and their structure. For this purpose they made 
a new dataset for the period 1990-2005 with socio-
economic and political variables and perform, and 
were estimated three regressions for three areas of 
the world (Asia, Latin America, America and Eu-
rope Union) which have recently experienced a 
democratic as well as economic transition. The re-
sults made it clear that tax revenue and tax compo-
sition, except for trade and property taxes are not 
significantly related to the strength of democratic 
institutions and civil liberties. Also, similar results 
were obtained on public spending except for social 
spending and defense expenditure. The study es-
tablished Doubts about the channels of public pol-
icy which Structures policy through them can in-
fluence on economic development. In this model 
Tax revenues are a function of the democracy in-
dex, the index of civil liberties, socio- economic 
control variables and Dummy variables.
Analysis of the Trend of Variables
In following, the trend of non-weighted aver-
age indexes of civil liberties, political rights indexes 
and the ratio of total tax revenues on GDP are ana-
lyzed. These data are derived from freedom house 
and WDI in selected countries of Middle East from 
1990-2010. 
Arch Puddington(2013) in paper: “Democrat-
ic Breakthroughs in the Balance” by  Selected data 
from Freedom House’s annual survey of political 
rights and civil liberties expresses that The Free-
dom in the World survey provides an annual evalu-
ation of the progress and decline of freedom in 195 
countries and 14 related and disputed territories. 
The survey, which includes both analytical reports 
and numerical ratings, measures freedom accord-
ing to two broad categories: political rights and civil 
liberties. 
Political rights ratings are based on an evalua-
tion of three subcategories: electoral process, po-
litical pluralism and participation, and functioning 
of government. Civil liberties ratings are based on 
an evaluation of four subcategories: freedom of ex-
pression and belief, associational and organization-
al rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and 
individual rights.
Each country is assigned a numerical rating 
from 1 to 7 for both political rights and civil liber-
ties, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least 
free. The ratings are determined by the total num-
ber of points (up to 100) each country receives on 10 
political rights questions and 15 civil liberties ques-
tions; countries receive 0 to 4 points on each ques-
tion, with 0 representing the smallest degree and 4 
the greatest degree of freedom. 
The average of the political rights and civil lib-
erties ratings, known as the freedom rating, deter-
mines the overall status: 
• Free (1.0 to 2.5)
• Partly Free (3.0 to 5.0)
• Not Free (5.5 to 7.0)
A Free country is one where there is open po-
litical competition, a climate of respect for civ-
il liberties, significant independent civic life, and 
independent media. A Partly Free country is one 
in which there is limited respect for political rights 
and civil liberties. Partly Free states frequently suf-
fer from an environment of corruption, weak rule of 
law, ethnic and religious strife, and a political land-
scape in which a single party enjoys dominance despite 
a certain degree of pluralism. A Not Free country is 
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one where basic political rights are absent, and basic 
civil liberties are widely and systematically denied.
The methodology of the survey is grounded in ba-
sic standards of political rights and civil liberties, de-
rived in large measure from relevant portions of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These stan-
dards apply to all countries and territories, irrespective 
of geographical location, ethnic or religious compo-
sition, or level of economic development. The sur-
vey does not rate governments or government per-
formance per se, but rather the real world rights and 
freedoms enjoyed by individuals. Freedoms can be af-
fected by state actions as well as by non-state actors, 
including insurgents and other armed groups. 2
According to chart (1), (2) and considering that 
larger numerical values (Closer to 7) Show unfavor-
able index of political rights and civil liberties and the 
smaller numeric values (Closer to 1) show a favorable 
state of civil liberties and political rights index, it can 
be stated that: 
• In the selected Middle East countries, Sudan has 
the worst and Armenia has the best indexes in non-weight-
ed average of civil liberties for the period: 1990-2010.
• In the same group Sudan and Syria, have the 
worst and Turkey has the best in Non-weighted aver-
age of political rights for the period 1990-2010.
Chart 1. Analysis the trend of non-weighted average of civil liberties index in selected Middle East countries.
Chart 2. Analysis the trend of non-weighted average of political rights index in selected Middle East countries.
Furthermore; according to chart (3), the follow-
ing can be concluded:
• Among the group of Middle East countries sur-
veyed Qatar has the highest and Emirates has the lowest 
in non-weighted average ratio of Tax revenues GDP.
Introducing the model
The present research is based on the studies by Pro-
feta, Puglisi , Scabrosetti (2010). This was also with con-
2Freedom House-2013
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sideration of different variables’ effects, utilizing the fol- lowing formula:
In this formula:
TAX: ratio of total tax revenues over GDP  
 CL: civil liberty index
PR:  political rights index
OPENNES: ratio of total import/export over 
GDP
ENRO: net rate of enrolment in primary school 
as a human capital index
GDP: rate of real Gross Domestic Product 
GEX: ratio of government expenditure on GDP 
U: Error term
i , t: country & time
Chart 3. Analysis the trend of non-weighted average of the ratio of total tax revenues on GDP in se-
lected Middle East countries.
Results
In this study, before estimating the model, pan-
el’s unit root test has been utilized to investigate sta-
tionary or non-stationary variables. The results are 
demonstrated in table 1.
Table (1) shows, according to fisher statistics, 
the ratio of total tax revenues on GDP, the civil lib-
erties and political rights index, the net rate of en-
rolment in primary school, the ratio of government 
expenditure on GDP, the openness index and GDP 
are stationary in level. Therefore, null hypothesis of 
existence of unit root is rejected. As a result, sta-
tionary of data related to the selected Middle East 
countries, will be confirmed prior to the analysis of 
the research model.
Furthermore, results of the co-integration test, 
also shows that there is a long term relation between 
the variables used.
To continue, estimate of the equation in the se-
lected Middle East countries, “GMM” - general-
ized method of moments - was used along with rely-
ing on the dynamic panel test. “GMM” method has 
been used in recent macroeconomics and financial 
studies. It, has a lot of advantages, for instance, re-
searchers such as Beck, Levine and loayza(2000), 
have used this method to eliminate the time series 
data variations and have found that very useful.
GMM estimator is calculated individual specif-
ic effects in the model by entering a relevant delayed 
variable as an explanatory variable. It allows a better 
control on endogenous of the explanatory variables. 
Regression TAX CL PR ENRO OPENNES GEX GDP
Fisher’s
statistics test 
(p value)
0.0493 0.0000 0.0000 0.0065 0.0002 0.0057 0.0000
Results I0 I0 I0 I0 I0 I0 I0
Table 1. Analysis the stationary or non-stationary of variables in selected Middle East countries.
Reference: findings of researcher
TAX it = β0+ β1TAXi,t-1+ β2CLit+ β3CLi,t-1+ β4PRit+ β5PRi,t-1+ β6OPENNESit+ β7ENROit+ β8GDPi,t+ β9GEXi,t+Ui,t
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Table 2. Results of estimating the impact of political development indexes on tax revenues with GMM 
method in selected countries of Middle East between 1990 and 2010.
Dependent Variable: TAX  (Ratio of total tax revenues on real GDP)
Variables Coefficients T Statistic
(TAX) -1 0.7531 14.62
CL -0.7950 -4.12
CL -1 -1.4206 -9.26
PR 1.5163 5.25
PR -1 3.0930 8.41
OPENNES -5.7134 -5.66
ENRO -0.1677 -5.85
GDP 0.0925 2.29
GEX -0.0920 -1.95
J-statistic 25.3
Reference: findings of researcher
The results of dynamic regression with general-
ized moment model (GMM) indicate that:
• Lagged ratio of total tax revenues on GDP 
has significant relationship with ratio of total tax rev-
enue on GDP.
• The correlation between civil liberties index 
and ratio of total tax revenues on GDP is negative 
and significant in selected countries of Middle East. 
Therefore, with the progress increase of civil lib-
erty index (the quantitative amount is higher than 
and closer to 7, this indicates negative value and un-
favorable conditions in civil liberties), the ratio of 
tax revenues on GDP decreases lower. Vice versa, 
regression decrease of civil liberties index (the quan-
titative amount is lower and closer to 1, this indicates 
positive value and favorable conditions in civil lib-
erties), the ratio of tax revenues on GDP increases 
higher. 
For explaining the mechanism, In the presence 
of freedom of speech and expression ideal condition 
(amounts less than and closer to 1), taxpayers are 
dealing with the government which is accountable, 
efficient and protector of individual rights, there-
fore, taxpayers are more willing to pay taxes and the 
tax revenues are increased. On the other hand, coun-
tries in which this index is (amounts higher than and 
closer to 7) and condition of civil liberties are not 
ideal, taxpayers are reluctant to pay taxes, the gov-
ernment in such countries, due to the nature of dic-
tatorship, inefficiency and non-accountability, are 
faced with tax evasion, and cannot enforce taxation 
laws and regulations and the result is lower tax rev-
enues. This negative and real relation, is remained 
when we consider lagged civil liberties index. 
Element of lag, is for avoiding the correlation 
between variables and the analysis the impact of so-
cio-political variables during the time.
• Political rights index has positive and sig-
nificant relationship with the ratio of total tax rev-
enues on GDP in selected countries of Middle East.
Therefore, with the increase in political rights 
index (the quantitative amount is higher than and 
closer to 7, this indicates negative value and unfa-
vorable conditions in political rights), the ratio of 
tax revenues on GDP, increases too. Vice versa, a 
decrease in political Rights Index (the quantitative 
amount is lower and closer to 1, this indicates posi-
tive value and favorable conditions in civil liberties), 
the ratio of tax revenues on GDP decreases too. 
To explain this mechanism further, it should be 
observed that in ideal condition of index, (Amounts 
less than and closer to 1), the governments are in 
need of public participation and voter attraction in 
the elections. Therefore, the state will introduce 
lower Taxes, on the other hand, if the Index of Polit-
ical Rights worsens (amounts larger and closer to 7), 
the oppressing governments while, not counting on 
the public participation, will impose higher Taxes.
This Positive and significant relation, is re-
mained when we consider lagged civil liberties in-
dex. Element of lag, is for avoiding the correlation 
between variables and the analysis the impact of so-
cio-political variables during the time.
• Openness index has negative and signifi-
cant relationship with the ratio of total tax revenues 
on GDP, in selected country of Middle East. 
This negative relation is due to the improvement 
in the degree of economical openness, which results 
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in the increase of the ratio of total import/export on 
GDP. On one side, this requires decrease in import/
export expenses, e.g.; lowering of Customs Tariffs. 
On the other side, special features of non-compet-
itive markets and excessive import against low ex-
ports, results in damages to the productions and 
employments in local industry, which affects and 
lowers the tax revenues level.
• The correlation between the net rate of en-
rolment in primary schools and the ratio of total tax 
revenue on GDP is negative and significant, in se-
lected countries of Middle East. 
• The rate of real GDP growth and the ratio of 
total tax revenues on GDP have positive and signifi-
cant relationship in selected countries of Middle East.
• Increase of real GDP, due to the improve-
ment of production, employment and income lev-
els, results in the increase of tax revenues.
• The correlation between the ratio of gov-
ernment expenditure on GDP and ratio of total tax 
revenues on GDP is negative and significant in se-
lected countries of Middle East. 
Therefore, with the increase in government ex-
penditures, the ratio of tax revenues on GDP de-
creases. This relation highlights the mechanism of 
government’s budget funds, which in the case of se-
lected Middle East countries is through natural re-
sources oil- gas- fossil Fuels-etc.
• Statistics of “Sargan Test” indicates that:
Distribution of   with equal degrees of freedom 
to excessive restrictions, causes the null hypothesis, 
“which states that, residuals are correlated with in-
strumental variable”, to be rejected. According to 
the results of this test, the instrumental variables 
used in estimation of the models are reliable, thus, 
the authenticity of the end results are verified for 
analysis and definition.
Conclusions 
This study is analyzing effects of political de-
velopment, (with emphasis on the civil liberties and 
political rights) on the tax revenues, in the select-
ed Middle East countries for the period 1990-2010. 
This research concludes that, with the improvement 
of civil liberties Index, taxpayers are more willing 
to pay their taxes. This fact is supported by the no-
tion ”state- accountability”, when the governments 
are protectors of the individual liberties and social 
rights, and are transparent and responsible in the 
public expenditure of tax revenues, which are even-
tually and consequently increased. 
Vice versa, dictatorships and governments with 
human right violation, who do not have an attitude, 
shall face Tax Evasion and the subsequent tax rev-
enue reduction.
Furthermore, with the improvement in politi-
cal rights, Middle East countries, while competing 
for voter sympathy, will promise a reduction in the 
taxes through their election campaign. On the other 
hand, with the absence of political parties, activists 
and state monopoly on the power, the need to so-
cial reform and improvement, such as, tax reduc-
tion, etc, will not be on the agenda.
Although, research in the fields of these two In-
dexes shows reluctance of the governments in im-
proving social condition and worsening of the social 
rights, new political developments, like democratic 
movements in the Middle East, such as Arab Spring
In Egypt, Syria, Bahrain and Turkey, has 
cleared the way for such governments to concen-
trate on these social demands.
The following suggestions are in that contest: 
• Reform in strict and unjustified Law and 
Judiciary. Formation of political parties, syndi-
cates, unions, NGOs, and a halt to the prosecution 
of social activists.
• Reform in the Electoral Law, to establish a 
fair and competitive Election process and fair com-
petition.
• Promote and establish, syndicate, unions, 
and NGOs in order to protect individual rights.
• Avoid self-centered attitude and promote 
social and plural approach.
• Reform of taxation law and regulations.
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